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AIGO — Cross-Framework Assurance Mapping

1. Document Purpose

This document defines the cross-framework assurance architecture for the AIGO mapping layer connecting:
  • the European Union Artificial Intelligence Act;
  • ISO/IEC 42001:2023; and
  • NIST AI RMF 1.0.
The purpose is to establish a reusable assurance model that can evaluate shared AIGO controls across multiple external frameworks while preserving the distinct criteria, applicability, authority, and conclusions of each framework. The intended assurance chain is:
This document does not establish statutory conformity, ISO certification, NIST endorsement, accreditation, or an external audit opinion.

2. Mapping Information


3. Assurance Architecture Principle

The cross-framework assurance model is:
A common AIGO control can support multiple frameworks, but the assurance criteria remain framework-specific.

4. Assurance Non-Equivalence Principle

The following relationships must never be assumed:
The correct architecture is:
The same evidence and control may be reused, but the conclusion belongs to the specific criterion being evaluated.

5. Source Framework Characteristics

ISO states that ISO/IEC 42001:2023 specifies requirements for establishing, implementing, maintaining, and continually improving an AIMS. NIST identifies AI RMF 1.0 as a voluntary framework and currently states that the framework is being updated. The EU AI Act is binding EU legislation; the current legal baseline must account for applicable amendments, including Regulation (EU) 2026/1744, which amended Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 on 8 July 2026.

6. Assurance Relationship Types

The registry should support:

7. Assurance Status Model

AIGO assurance records should support:
These statuses describe AIGO assurance activities. They do not represent a legal, certification, or NIST status.

8. Assurance Conclusion Model

AIGO may use:
Every conclusion must identify:
  • framework;
  • criterion;
  • scope;
  • evidence period;
  • reviewer;
  • limitations.

9. Framework-Specific Conclusion Rule

A single AIGO control may produce different conclusions:
This is intentional. Control effectiveness is relationship-specific.

10. Assurance Scope

Each cross-framework assurance activity should identify:
  • organization;
  • AI system or portfolio;
  • lifecycle stage;
  • applicable framework;
  • framework version;
  • requirement;
  • AIGO control;
  • evidence period;
  • assurance period;
  • assurance type;
  • reviewer;
  • limitations.

11. Assurance Criteria Hierarchy

The criteria hierarchy is:
The individual framework package remains authoritative for interpretation.

12. Cross-Framework Criteria Rule

Where multiple frameworks map to one AIGO control:
the assurance activity must retain separate criteria. It must not evaluate the common control against one framework and automatically transfer the result to the others.

13. Assurance Planning

Assurance planning should consider:
  • risk;
  • legal significance;
  • AI-system impact;
  • control criticality;
  • previous findings;
  • change;
  • incidents;
  • evidence quality;
  • framework-specific deadlines.

14. Risk-Based Prioritization

Priority may be:
Factors may include:
  • potential harm;
  • fundamental-rights impact;
  • safety;
  • security;
  • regulatory exposure;
  • organizational criticality;
  • uncertainty;
  • previous findings.
Priority is an AIGO assurance attribute, not a universal score from the external frameworks.

15. Common Assurance Planning Model

The planning process is:

16. Common Control Assurance

A common AIGO control should be evaluated in layers:
A control that exists on paper is not automatically effective.

17. Design Assurance

Design assurance examines whether the control:
  • addresses the intended objective;
  • identifies ownership;
  • defines activity;
  • establishes evidence;
  • defines monitoring;
  • defines escalation;
  • aligns with the applicable framework criterion.

18. Implementation Assurance

Implementation assurance verifies whether the control has actually been established. Potential evidence:
  • procedure;
  • workflow;
  • configuration;
  • assigned owner;
  • implementation record;
  • training;
  • system state.

19. Operating-Effectiveness Assurance

Where included in scope, operating-effectiveness testing determines whether the control operated during the defined evidence period. Potential methods:
  • sampling;
  • inspection;
  • observation;
  • reperformance;
  • interview;
  • system testing;
  • evidence review.

20. Evidence Assurance

Evidence assurance evaluates:
The evidence requirements defined in the cross-framework evidence mapping remain the supporting architecture.

21. Requirement Traceability

The minimum assurance traceability chain is:
The full chain should be:

22. GOVERNANCE Assurance

Governance assurance examines:
  • accountability;
  • roles;
  • decision authority;
  • policies;
  • escalation;
  • resources;
  • governance bodies;
  • oversight;
  • management review.

23. GOVERNANCE — EU AI Act

The assurance review should evaluate applicable governance obligations according to:
  • actor role;
  • system category;
  • applicable provisions;
  • organizational structure;
  • regulatory responsibilities.
AIGO assurance must not claim that governance evidence establishes statutory compliance without evaluating the relevant legal criterion.

24. GOVERNANCE — ISO/IEC 42001

Assurance should evaluate whether governance supports the AIMS’s:
  • scope;
  • leadership;
  • policy;
  • roles;
  • planning;
  • operation;
  • performance evaluation;
  • improvement.
ISO confirms that ISO/IEC 42001 is a management-system standard covering policies, objectives, processes, and continual improvement for AI management.

25. GOVERNANCE — NIST AI RMF

Assurance should evaluate GOVERN-related outcomes and organizational processes. NIST describes GOVERN as a cross-cutting AI RMF function that informs the other functions and is intended to be infused throughout AI risk management.

26. CONTEXT Assurance

Context assurance evaluates whether the organization understands:
  • AI-system purpose;
  • deployment environment;
  • stakeholders;
  • affected persons;
  • dependencies;
  • applicable requirements;
  • lifecycle state.

27. Applicability Assurance

Applicability assurance determines whether the organization has correctly identified which source requirements apply. The model is:

28. Applicability — EU AI Act

Assurance should verify the legal applicability assessment against the current applicable EU AI Act provisions and amendments. The EU AI Act legal baseline must account for Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 together with applicable amendments, including Regulation (EU) 2026/1744.

29. Applicability — ISO/IEC 42001

Assurance should evaluate:
  • AIMS scope;
  • organization context;
  • relevant interested parties;
  • applicable management-system requirements.
ISO/IEC 42001 remains published as Edition 1, dated December 2023.

30. Applicability — NIST AI RMF

NIST AI RMF is voluntary and flexible. Assurance should therefore evaluate the organization’s declared adoption scope and rationale. NIST states that AI RMF is intended to be tailored by organizations and is not a fixed mandatory implementation sequence.

31. Risk Assurance

Risk assurance evaluates:

32. Risk — Shared Control

The common risk control may support all three frameworks. But testing must distinguish:

33. Impact Assurance

Impact assurance evaluates whether:
  • affected parties were considered;
  • relevant harms were identified;
  • impacts were evaluated;
  • mitigations were selected;
  • residual impacts were reviewed.

34. Data Assurance

Data assurance may evaluate:
  • provenance;
  • quality;
  • relevance;
  • representativeness;
  • lineage;
  • privacy;
  • bias;
  • security;
  • retention.
The applicable criteria vary by framework and system.

35. Lifecycle Assurance

The AIGO lifecycle is:
The three source frameworks may apply different requirements at these stages. NIST explicitly describes AI RMF risk management as continuous and applicable throughout AI-system lifecycle dimensions.

36. Human-Oversight Assurance

Assurance may evaluate:
  • responsibility;
  • authority;
  • competence;
  • information;
  • intervention;
  • override;
  • escalation;
  • monitoring.
EU AI Act criteria remain distinct from NIST and ISO criteria.

37. Transparency Assurance

Assurance may evaluate:
  • required notices;
  • documentation;
  • explanations;
  • disclosures;
  • communications;
  • stakeholder information.
A statutory transparency requirement must be tested against the applicable legal provision.

38. Performance Assurance

Performance assurance may evaluate:
  • accuracy;
  • reliability;
  • robustness;
  • availability;
  • error rates;
  • safety;
  • security;
  • fairness indicators.
The applicable metrics should be risk-based.

39. Security Assurance

Security assurance may evaluate:
  • access control;
  • model integrity;
  • vulnerabilities;
  • adversarial robustness;
  • supply-chain security;
  • logging;
  • incident response;
  • resilience.

40. Privacy Assurance

Privacy assurance may evaluate:
  • lawful data use;
  • data minimization;
  • privacy risk;
  • access;
  • retention;
  • security;
  • privacy testing.
The AIGO cross-framework layer must not treat this as a substitute for a separate GDPR or privacy-law mapping.

41. Fairness Assurance

Fairness assurance may evaluate:
  • subgroup performance;
  • harmful bias;
  • discrimination risks;
  • mitigation;
  • retesting;
  • monitoring.
Criteria must be tied to the relevant source framework.

42. Explainability Assurance

Where applicable, assurance may evaluate:
  • explanation method;
  • explanation quality;
  • consistency;
  • usability;
  • limitations;
  • human understanding.

43. Monitoring Assurance

Monitoring assurance evaluates:
A monitoring system that collects metrics without analysis or action may be ineffective.

44. Incident Assurance

Incident assurance evaluates:
The specific notification requirement must be evaluated separately for each applicable framework.

45. Change Assurance

Change assurance evaluates:
  • change request;
  • impact assessment;
  • risk reassessment;
  • control review;
  • approval;
  • testing;
  • deployment;
  • post-change monitoring.

46. Third-Party Assurance

Third-party assurance may evaluate:
  • supplier assessment;
  • contractual obligations;
  • technical evidence;
  • supplier monitoring;
  • incidents;
  • changes;
  • external assurance.

47. Competence Assurance

Competence assurance should assess:
  • role requirements;
  • competence criteria;
  • training;
  • experience;
  • evaluation;
  • awareness.
EU AI Act AI-literacy obligations must remain separately assessed against their statutory requirements.

48. Evidence Reuse Assurance

Before reusing evidence across frameworks, assurance should verify:

49. Shared Evidence Assurance

A shared record may be evaluated once for common attributes:
  • authenticity;
  • integrity;
  • version;
  • provenance.
Then separately for framework sufficiency.

50. Framework-Specific Evidence Assurance

Where a framework requires additional information:
must be tested.

51. Assurance Sampling

Sampling may be used for:
  • AI systems;
  • risk assessments;
  • control executions;
  • incidents;
  • changes;
  • monitoring;
  • evidence;
  • suppliers.
The population and sampling approach must be documented.

52. Sampling Risk

Sampling should consider:
  • AI-system impact;
  • legal importance;
  • control criticality;
  • change frequency;
  • previous findings;
  • system population.

53. Technical Assurance

Technical assurance may be required for:
  • model performance;
  • robustness;
  • safety;
  • security;
  • fairness;
  • data quality;
  • system integration.
Technical assurance personnel should have appropriate competence.

54. Assurance Independence

Where independence is required by the assurance methodology, reviewers should not be solely responsible for operating the control under review. The assurance record should identify:
  • reviewer;
  • role;
  • operational involvement;
  • conflicts;
  • safeguards.

55. Assurance Competence

The assurance team should possess appropriate competence in:
  • AI governance;
  • risk management;
  • the applicable source framework;
  • AIGO controls;
  • evidence evaluation;
  • technical AI where required.

56. Internal Assurance

AIGO internal assurance can evaluate:
  • control design;
  • implementation;
  • operation;
  • evidence;
  • monitoring;
  • effectiveness.
It does not replace:
  • statutory regulatory oversight;
  • ISO certification;
  • formal conformity assessment.

57. ISO Internal Audit

Where an organization operates an ISO/IEC 42001 AIMS, its internal-audit processes remain part of the management-system architecture. AIGO can provide assurance infrastructure and evidence integration without representing AIGO assurance as an ISO certification audit.

58. ISO Certification Boundary

ISO/IEC 42001 certification is distinct from AIGO assurance. The cross-framework assurance layer may support certification readiness, but:
ISO/IEC 42001 remains the applicable management-system standard.

59. EU Regulatory Assurance Boundary

EU AI Act-related assurance must preserve:
  • legal applicability;
  • actor roles;
  • statutory deadlines;
  • conformity mechanisms;
  • authority interactions;
  • legally required documentation.
AIGO assurance can support readiness and evidence organization but does not create a statutory legal decision.

60. NIST Assurance Boundary

NIST AI RMF 1.0 remains a voluntary framework. NIST’s current resources state that it is being updated and that the framework is intended as a voluntary resource. Therefore the assurance result should be expressed as:
rather than:

61. Certification / Readiness Categories

AIGO may use:
These categories should not be treated as equivalent.

62. Cross-Framework Assurance

A combined assurance activity may evaluate a shared control against:
provided:
  • all criteria are identified;
  • reviewers are competent;
  • evidence is sufficient;
  • conclusions are separately recorded.

63. Combined Assurance Report

A combined report may contain:

64. Framework-Specific Findings

A finding may apply to only one framework:
The finding must not be propagated automatically.

65. Shared-Control Finding

A common control weakness may affect several frameworks:
This enables common remediation while retaining framework-specific accountability.

66. Root Cause Analysis

For material shared findings, root-cause analysis should identify whether the failure arose from:
  • governance;
  • control design;
  • implementation;
  • competence;
  • technology;
  • data;
  • supplier;
  • monitoring;
  • evidence.

67. Corrective Action

Corrective action should include:
  • action;
  • owner;
  • due date;
  • evidence;
  • verification;
  • affected frameworks.

68. Corrective-Action Reuse

A single corrective action may address multiple framework findings if:
are established.

69. Follow-Up Assurance

Follow-up should verify:

70. Finding Closure

Finding closure requires evidence. A management statement such as:
“The action is complete”
should not by itself constitute effectiveness evidence.

71. Management Review Integration

Cross-framework assurance results should feed the AIGO Management Review process. Potential inputs:
  • critical findings;
  • control effectiveness;
  • evidence gaps;
  • regulatory gaps;
  • certification readiness;
  • NIST assessment results;
  • framework changes.

72. Improvement Integration

Assurance results should feed:
This creates a reusable cross-framework improvement loop.

73. Assurance and Change Management

A change to a shared AIGO control should trigger:

74. Assurance and Framework Updates

Framework changes should trigger:

75. EU AI Act Change Assurance

The EU AI Act mapping must be reviewed when applicable amendments or authoritative interpretations materially change requirements. Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 was published on 24 July 2026 and amended Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, so the mapping and assurance baseline should maintain explicit amendment/version metadata.

76. ISO Change Assurance

ISO/IEC 42001 remains the published 2023 edition. Assurance criteria should therefore identify: ISO/IEC 42001:2023 rather than using only the shortened label ISO 42001.

77. NIST Change Assurance

NIST states that AI RMF 1.0 is being updated. The current AIGO assurance baseline should remain explicitly: NIST AI RMF 1.0 until a new framework version is deliberately adopted into the mapping.

78. Historical Assurance

Historical assurance records should preserve:
Later framework changes must not rewrite historical conclusions.

79. Assurance Reperformance

Reperformance should be considered after:
  • framework changes;
  • material AI-system changes;
  • control changes;
  • significant incidents;
  • major evidence failures;
  • repeated findings.

80. Assurance Coverage

Cross-framework assurance coverage should calculate:

81. Framework-Specific Coverage

Coverage should be reported separately:
Do not combine them into one universal compliance percentage.

82. Cross-Framework Coverage

A management view may additionally show:
These are operational efficiency metrics.

83. Assurance Gap Categories

Potential categories:

84. Cross-Framework Assurance Findings

Potential identifiers:

85. Critical Assurance Findings

Potential critical findings include:
  • material legal requirement has no assurance coverage;
  • critical control lacks evidence;
  • framework-specific criterion is incorrectly treated as covered by another framework;
  • assurance relies on obsolete framework criteria;
  • high-risk AI system lacks effective assurance;
  • serious incident does not trigger follow-up;
  • management review does not address material assurance failures.

86. False Assurance Detection

The validation layer should detect statements equivalent to:
These are invalid conclusions. The appropriate statement is:

87. Assurance Evidence Reuse

A shared assurance activity may reuse evidence, but the assurance workpaper should identify:
  • framework;
  • criterion;
  • test;
  • result.

88. Assurance Workpaper Model

Potential fields:

89. Assurance Independence Metadata

Where relevant:
should be retained.

90. Assurance Competence Metadata

Potential competence domains:

91. External-Assurance Evidence

External reports can support AIGO assurance when their:
  • issuer;
  • scope;
  • criteria;
  • date;
  • methodology;
  • limitations;
are validated. An external report must not be treated as proof of a different framework without evaluation.

92. Supplier Assurance

Supplier assurance evidence should identify:
  • provider;
  • system/component;
  • scope;
  • version;
  • report date;
  • criteria;
  • limitations.

93. Technical Assurance

Technical assurance should be scoped independently where specialist expertise is required. For example:
may be combined in one programme but should retain separate competencies and criteria.

94. Assurance of Human Oversight

Assurance should test not merely whether a human is assigned, but whether the human has:
  • information;
  • competence;
  • authority;
  • opportunity to intervene;
  • escalation capability.

95. Assurance of Monitoring

Monitoring assurance should verify that:
  • metrics are appropriate;
  • thresholds are defined where needed;
  • results are reviewed;
  • alerts are actionable;
  • actions are recorded.

96. Assurance of Improvement

Improvement assurance should establish:

97. Assurance and Retirement

At retirement, assurance may verify:
  • final risk state;
  • unresolved obligations;
  • evidence retention;
  • incident closure;
  • governance closure;
  • lessons learned.

98. Cross-Framework Assurance Registry

The registry should support:
This structure is defined in the cross-framework mapping registry.

99. Validation Requirements

The assurance package should pass:

100. Assurance Validation Logic

For every assurance relationship:

101. Assurance Automation

The future AIGO validation tools should be able to answer:

102. Assurance Dashboard

Potential measures:

103. Assurance Efficiency

AIGO may track:
This measures operational efficiency without treating reuse as equivalence.

104. Assurance Maturity

An internal model may use:
This is an AIGO maturity model.

105. V1 Assurance Objective

For AIGO v1, the assurance layer should demonstrate that:
can be traced automatically or deterministically for the major framework relationships.

106. Cross-Framework Assurance Example

Example common control:
Assurance may evaluate:
The same risk assessment evidence may be reused, but the tests and conclusions remain separate.

107. Cross-Framework Assurance Example — Monitoring

Potential assurance relationships:

108. Cross-Framework Assurance Example — Incident

Potential assurance relationships:
The statutory reporting requirement remains distinct.

109. Cross-Framework Assurance Example — Evidence

Assurance may test:

110. Cross-Framework Assurance Example — Governance

Assurance may test:
  • role assignments;
  • decision rights;
  • approvals;
  • policy;
  • escalation;
  • management review.

111. Cross-Framework Assurance Example — Change

Assurance may test:
  • change classification;
  • risk impact;
  • applicability review;
  • approval;
  • testing;
  • evidence;
  • post-change monitoring.

112. Cross-Framework Assurance Example — Competence

Assurance should separate:

113. Cross-Framework Assurance Example — Transparency

Assurance should distinguish:
  • statutory transparency;
  • management-system transparency;
  • trustworthy-AI transparency.

114. Source-Change Monitoring

AIGO should monitor:
  • EU AI Act amendments;
  • official EU implementation material;
  • ISO/IEC 42001 status;
  • relevant ISO publications;
  • NIST AI RMF revisions;
  • applicable NIST profiles.
The current NIST AI RMF page states that AI RMF 1.0 is being revised.

115. Current Source Baselines

EU AI Act

The legal baseline includes Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 and its applicable amendments, including Regulation (EU) 2026/1744.

ISO/IEC 42001

ISO/IEC 42001:2023, Edition 1, published December 2023.

NIST

NIST AI RMF 1.0, with the current AIRC indicating that a revised version is in progress.

116. Historical Assurance

The repository must preserve historical assurance when source frameworks change. Historical records should not be retroactively evaluated using a newer version unless a deliberate re-assurance activity is performed.

117. Assurance Re-baselining

A new framework version should trigger:

118. Assurance and Release Governance

AIGO v1 should not be released unless:

119. V1 Assurance Gate

The v1 assurance gate should verify:

120. Assurance Findings

Potential final identifiers:

121. Final Assurance Architecture

The complete cross-framework assurance architecture is:

122. Final Principle

The AIGO cross-framework assurance layer follows one governing principle:
Share operational assurance infrastructure where it is efficient and defensible, but preserve the independent criteria and conclusions of every framework.
One control may be tested once for common characteristics and then evaluated against multiple framework-specific criteria. One evidence record may support multiple assessments, but evidence sufficiency must be determined separately. One corrective action may resolve several findings, but each framework relationship remains traceable. The goal is integrated assurance without false equivalence.

123. Document Control


124. Document Status

Document: AIGO — Cross-Framework Assurance Mapping Version: 0.1 Status: Draft Working Name: AIGO Full Name: AI Governance Operating Framework Document Identifier: AIGO-MAP-XFW-004 Document Type: Cross-Framework Assurance Mapping This document establishes the common assurance architecture for the EU AI Act, ISO/IEC 42001, and NIST AI RMF mappings, enabling shared control testing, evidence reuse, relationship-specific conclusions, cross-framework findings, corrective action, and continual improvement while preserving the distinct legal, normative, voluntary, version-specific, and certification boundaries of each source framework. End of Document