AIGO — Cross-Framework Assurance Mapping
1. Document Purpose
This document defines the cross-framework assurance architecture for the AIGO mapping layer connecting:- the European Union Artificial Intelligence Act;
- ISO/IEC 42001:2023; and
- NIST AI RMF 1.0.
2. Mapping Information
3. Assurance Architecture Principle
The cross-framework assurance model is:4. Assurance Non-Equivalence Principle
The following relationships must never be assumed:5. Source Framework Characteristics
ISO states that ISO/IEC 42001:2023 specifies requirements for establishing, implementing, maintaining, and continually improving an AIMS.
NIST identifies AI RMF 1.0 as a voluntary framework and currently states that the framework is being updated.
The EU AI Act is binding EU legislation; the current legal baseline must account for applicable amendments, including Regulation (EU) 2026/1744, which amended Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 on 8 July 2026.
6. Assurance Relationship Types
The registry should support:7. Assurance Status Model
AIGO assurance records should support:8. Assurance Conclusion Model
AIGO may use:- framework;
- criterion;
- scope;
- evidence period;
- reviewer;
- limitations.
9. Framework-Specific Conclusion Rule
A single AIGO control may produce different conclusions:10. Assurance Scope
Each cross-framework assurance activity should identify:- organization;
- AI system or portfolio;
- lifecycle stage;
- applicable framework;
- framework version;
- requirement;
- AIGO control;
- evidence period;
- assurance period;
- assurance type;
- reviewer;
- limitations.
11. Assurance Criteria Hierarchy
The criteria hierarchy is:12. Cross-Framework Criteria Rule
Where multiple frameworks map to one AIGO control:13. Assurance Planning
Assurance planning should consider:- risk;
- legal significance;
- AI-system impact;
- control criticality;
- previous findings;
- change;
- incidents;
- evidence quality;
- framework-specific deadlines.
14. Risk-Based Prioritization
Priority may be:- potential harm;
- fundamental-rights impact;
- safety;
- security;
- regulatory exposure;
- organizational criticality;
- uncertainty;
- previous findings.
15. Common Assurance Planning Model
The planning process is:16. Common Control Assurance
A common AIGO control should be evaluated in layers:17. Design Assurance
Design assurance examines whether the control:- addresses the intended objective;
- identifies ownership;
- defines activity;
- establishes evidence;
- defines monitoring;
- defines escalation;
- aligns with the applicable framework criterion.
18. Implementation Assurance
Implementation assurance verifies whether the control has actually been established. Potential evidence:- procedure;
- workflow;
- configuration;
- assigned owner;
- implementation record;
- training;
- system state.
19. Operating-Effectiveness Assurance
Where included in scope, operating-effectiveness testing determines whether the control operated during the defined evidence period. Potential methods:- sampling;
- inspection;
- observation;
- reperformance;
- interview;
- system testing;
- evidence review.
20. Evidence Assurance
Evidence assurance evaluates:21. Requirement Traceability
The minimum assurance traceability chain is:22. GOVERNANCE Assurance
Governance assurance examines:- accountability;
- roles;
- decision authority;
- policies;
- escalation;
- resources;
- governance bodies;
- oversight;
- management review.
23. GOVERNANCE — EU AI Act
The assurance review should evaluate applicable governance obligations according to:- actor role;
- system category;
- applicable provisions;
- organizational structure;
- regulatory responsibilities.
24. GOVERNANCE — ISO/IEC 42001
Assurance should evaluate whether governance supports the AIMS’s:- scope;
- leadership;
- policy;
- roles;
- planning;
- operation;
- performance evaluation;
- improvement.
25. GOVERNANCE — NIST AI RMF
Assurance should evaluate GOVERN-related outcomes and organizational processes. NIST describes GOVERN as a cross-cutting AI RMF function that informs the other functions and is intended to be infused throughout AI risk management.26. CONTEXT Assurance
Context assurance evaluates whether the organization understands:- AI-system purpose;
- deployment environment;
- stakeholders;
- affected persons;
- dependencies;
- applicable requirements;
- lifecycle state.
27. Applicability Assurance
Applicability assurance determines whether the organization has correctly identified which source requirements apply. The model is:28. Applicability — EU AI Act
Assurance should verify the legal applicability assessment against the current applicable EU AI Act provisions and amendments. The EU AI Act legal baseline must account for Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 together with applicable amendments, including Regulation (EU) 2026/1744.29. Applicability — ISO/IEC 42001
Assurance should evaluate:- AIMS scope;
- organization context;
- relevant interested parties;
- applicable management-system requirements.
30. Applicability — NIST AI RMF
NIST AI RMF is voluntary and flexible. Assurance should therefore evaluate the organization’s declared adoption scope and rationale. NIST states that AI RMF is intended to be tailored by organizations and is not a fixed mandatory implementation sequence.31. Risk Assurance
Risk assurance evaluates:32. Risk — Shared Control
The common risk control may support all three frameworks. But testing must distinguish:33. Impact Assurance
Impact assurance evaluates whether:- affected parties were considered;
- relevant harms were identified;
- impacts were evaluated;
- mitigations were selected;
- residual impacts were reviewed.
34. Data Assurance
Data assurance may evaluate:- provenance;
- quality;
- relevance;
- representativeness;
- lineage;
- privacy;
- bias;
- security;
- retention.
35. Lifecycle Assurance
The AIGO lifecycle is:36. Human-Oversight Assurance
Assurance may evaluate:- responsibility;
- authority;
- competence;
- information;
- intervention;
- override;
- escalation;
- monitoring.
37. Transparency Assurance
Assurance may evaluate:- required notices;
- documentation;
- explanations;
- disclosures;
- communications;
- stakeholder information.
38. Performance Assurance
Performance assurance may evaluate:- accuracy;
- reliability;
- robustness;
- availability;
- error rates;
- safety;
- security;
- fairness indicators.
39. Security Assurance
Security assurance may evaluate:- access control;
- model integrity;
- vulnerabilities;
- adversarial robustness;
- supply-chain security;
- logging;
- incident response;
- resilience.
40. Privacy Assurance
Privacy assurance may evaluate:- lawful data use;
- data minimization;
- privacy risk;
- access;
- retention;
- security;
- privacy testing.
41. Fairness Assurance
Fairness assurance may evaluate:- subgroup performance;
- harmful bias;
- discrimination risks;
- mitigation;
- retesting;
- monitoring.
42. Explainability Assurance
Where applicable, assurance may evaluate:- explanation method;
- explanation quality;
- consistency;
- usability;
- limitations;
- human understanding.
43. Monitoring Assurance
Monitoring assurance evaluates:44. Incident Assurance
Incident assurance evaluates:45. Change Assurance
Change assurance evaluates:- change request;
- impact assessment;
- risk reassessment;
- control review;
- approval;
- testing;
- deployment;
- post-change monitoring.
46. Third-Party Assurance
Third-party assurance may evaluate:- supplier assessment;
- contractual obligations;
- technical evidence;
- supplier monitoring;
- incidents;
- changes;
- external assurance.
47. Competence Assurance
Competence assurance should assess:- role requirements;
- competence criteria;
- training;
- experience;
- evaluation;
- awareness.
48. Evidence Reuse Assurance
Before reusing evidence across frameworks, assurance should verify:49. Shared Evidence Assurance
A shared record may be evaluated once for common attributes:- authenticity;
- integrity;
- version;
- provenance.
50. Framework-Specific Evidence Assurance
Where a framework requires additional information:51. Assurance Sampling
Sampling may be used for:- AI systems;
- risk assessments;
- control executions;
- incidents;
- changes;
- monitoring;
- evidence;
- suppliers.
52. Sampling Risk
Sampling should consider:- AI-system impact;
- legal importance;
- control criticality;
- change frequency;
- previous findings;
- system population.
53. Technical Assurance
Technical assurance may be required for:- model performance;
- robustness;
- safety;
- security;
- fairness;
- data quality;
- system integration.
54. Assurance Independence
Where independence is required by the assurance methodology, reviewers should not be solely responsible for operating the control under review. The assurance record should identify:- reviewer;
- role;
- operational involvement;
- conflicts;
- safeguards.
55. Assurance Competence
The assurance team should possess appropriate competence in:- AI governance;
- risk management;
- the applicable source framework;
- AIGO controls;
- evidence evaluation;
- technical AI where required.
56. Internal Assurance
AIGO internal assurance can evaluate:- control design;
- implementation;
- operation;
- evidence;
- monitoring;
- effectiveness.
- statutory regulatory oversight;
- ISO certification;
- formal conformity assessment.
57. ISO Internal Audit
Where an organization operates an ISO/IEC 42001 AIMS, its internal-audit processes remain part of the management-system architecture. AIGO can provide assurance infrastructure and evidence integration without representing AIGO assurance as an ISO certification audit.58. ISO Certification Boundary
ISO/IEC 42001 certification is distinct from AIGO assurance. The cross-framework assurance layer may support certification readiness, but:59. EU Regulatory Assurance Boundary
EU AI Act-related assurance must preserve:- legal applicability;
- actor roles;
- statutory deadlines;
- conformity mechanisms;
- authority interactions;
- legally required documentation.
60. NIST Assurance Boundary
NIST AI RMF 1.0 remains a voluntary framework. NIST’s current resources state that it is being updated and that the framework is intended as a voluntary resource. Therefore the assurance result should be expressed as:61. Certification / Readiness Categories
AIGO may use:62. Cross-Framework Assurance
A combined assurance activity may evaluate a shared control against:- all criteria are identified;
- reviewers are competent;
- evidence is sufficient;
- conclusions are separately recorded.
63. Combined Assurance Report
A combined report may contain:64. Framework-Specific Findings
A finding may apply to only one framework:65. Shared-Control Finding
A common control weakness may affect several frameworks:66. Root Cause Analysis
For material shared findings, root-cause analysis should identify whether the failure arose from:- governance;
- control design;
- implementation;
- competence;
- technology;
- data;
- supplier;
- monitoring;
- evidence.
67. Corrective Action
Corrective action should include:- action;
- owner;
- due date;
- evidence;
- verification;
- affected frameworks.
68. Corrective-Action Reuse
A single corrective action may address multiple framework findings if:69. Follow-Up Assurance
Follow-up should verify:70. Finding Closure
Finding closure requires evidence. A management statement such as:“The action is complete”should not by itself constitute effectiveness evidence.
71. Management Review Integration
Cross-framework assurance results should feed the AIGO Management Review process. Potential inputs:- critical findings;
- control effectiveness;
- evidence gaps;
- regulatory gaps;
- certification readiness;
- NIST assessment results;
- framework changes.
72. Improvement Integration
Assurance results should feed:73. Assurance and Change Management
A change to a shared AIGO control should trigger:74. Assurance and Framework Updates
Framework changes should trigger:75. EU AI Act Change Assurance
The EU AI Act mapping must be reviewed when applicable amendments or authoritative interpretations materially change requirements. Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 was published on 24 July 2026 and amended Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, so the mapping and assurance baseline should maintain explicit amendment/version metadata.76. ISO Change Assurance
ISO/IEC 42001 remains the published 2023 edition. Assurance criteria should therefore identify:ISO/IEC 42001:2023
rather than using only the shortened label ISO 42001.
77. NIST Change Assurance
NIST states that AI RMF 1.0 is being updated. The current AIGO assurance baseline should remain explicitly:NIST AI RMF 1.0
until a new framework version is deliberately adopted into the mapping.
78. Historical Assurance
Historical assurance records should preserve:79. Assurance Reperformance
Reperformance should be considered after:- framework changes;
- material AI-system changes;
- control changes;
- significant incidents;
- major evidence failures;
- repeated findings.
80. Assurance Coverage
Cross-framework assurance coverage should calculate:81. Framework-Specific Coverage
Coverage should be reported separately:82. Cross-Framework Coverage
A management view may additionally show:83. Assurance Gap Categories
Potential categories:84. Cross-Framework Assurance Findings
Potential identifiers:85. Critical Assurance Findings
Potential critical findings include:- material legal requirement has no assurance coverage;
- critical control lacks evidence;
- framework-specific criterion is incorrectly treated as covered by another framework;
- assurance relies on obsolete framework criteria;
- high-risk AI system lacks effective assurance;
- serious incident does not trigger follow-up;
- management review does not address material assurance failures.
86. False Assurance Detection
The validation layer should detect statements equivalent to:87. Assurance Evidence Reuse
A shared assurance activity may reuse evidence, but the assurance workpaper should identify:- framework;
- criterion;
- test;
- result.
88. Assurance Workpaper Model
Potential fields:89. Assurance Independence Metadata
Where relevant:90. Assurance Competence Metadata
Potential competence domains:91. External-Assurance Evidence
External reports can support AIGO assurance when their:- issuer;
- scope;
- criteria;
- date;
- methodology;
- limitations;
92. Supplier Assurance
Supplier assurance evidence should identify:- provider;
- system/component;
- scope;
- version;
- report date;
- criteria;
- limitations.
93. Technical Assurance
Technical assurance should be scoped independently where specialist expertise is required. For example:94. Assurance of Human Oversight
Assurance should test not merely whether a human is assigned, but whether the human has:- information;
- competence;
- authority;
- opportunity to intervene;
- escalation capability.
95. Assurance of Monitoring
Monitoring assurance should verify that:- metrics are appropriate;
- thresholds are defined where needed;
- results are reviewed;
- alerts are actionable;
- actions are recorded.
96. Assurance of Improvement
Improvement assurance should establish:97. Assurance and Retirement
At retirement, assurance may verify:- final risk state;
- unresolved obligations;
- evidence retention;
- incident closure;
- governance closure;
- lessons learned.
98. Cross-Framework Assurance Registry
The registry should support:99. Validation Requirements
The assurance package should pass:100. Assurance Validation Logic
For every assurance relationship:101. Assurance Automation
The future AIGO validation tools should be able to answer:102. Assurance Dashboard
Potential measures:103. Assurance Efficiency
AIGO may track:104. Assurance Maturity
An internal model may use:105. V1 Assurance Objective
For AIGO v1, the assurance layer should demonstrate that:106. Cross-Framework Assurance Example
Example common control:107. Cross-Framework Assurance Example — Monitoring
108. Cross-Framework Assurance Example — Incident
109. Cross-Framework Assurance Example — Evidence
110. Cross-Framework Assurance Example — Governance
- role assignments;
- decision rights;
- approvals;
- policy;
- escalation;
- management review.
111. Cross-Framework Assurance Example — Change
- change classification;
- risk impact;
- applicability review;
- approval;
- testing;
- evidence;
- post-change monitoring.
112. Cross-Framework Assurance Example — Competence
113. Cross-Framework Assurance Example — Transparency
- statutory transparency;
- management-system transparency;
- trustworthy-AI transparency.
114. Source-Change Monitoring
AIGO should monitor:- EU AI Act amendments;
- official EU implementation material;
- ISO/IEC 42001 status;
- relevant ISO publications;
- NIST AI RMF revisions;
- applicable NIST profiles.
115. Current Source Baselines
EU AI Act
The legal baseline includes Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 and its applicable amendments, including Regulation (EU) 2026/1744.ISO/IEC 42001
ISO/IEC 42001:2023, Edition 1, published December 2023.
NIST
NIST AI RMF 1.0, with the current AIRC indicating that a revised version is in progress.
116. Historical Assurance
The repository must preserve historical assurance when source frameworks change. Historical records should not be retroactively evaluated using a newer version unless a deliberate re-assurance activity is performed.117. Assurance Re-baselining
A new framework version should trigger:118. Assurance and Release Governance
AIGO v1 should not be released unless:119. V1 Assurance Gate
The v1 assurance gate should verify:120. Assurance Findings
Potential final identifiers:121. Final Assurance Architecture
The complete cross-framework assurance architecture is:122. Final Principle
The AIGO cross-framework assurance layer follows one governing principle:Share operational assurance infrastructure where it is efficient and defensible, but preserve the independent criteria and conclusions of every framework.One control may be tested once for common characteristics and then evaluated against multiple framework-specific criteria. One evidence record may support multiple assessments, but evidence sufficiency must be determined separately. One corrective action may resolve several findings, but each framework relationship remains traceable. The goal is integrated assurance without false equivalence.
123. Document Control
124. Document Status
Document: AIGO — Cross-Framework Assurance Mapping Version: 0.1 Status: Draft Working Name: AIGO Full Name: AI Governance Operating Framework Document Identifier:AIGO-MAP-XFW-004
Document Type: Cross-Framework Assurance Mapping
This document establishes the common assurance architecture for the EU AI Act, ISO/IEC 42001, and NIST AI RMF mappings, enabling shared control testing, evidence reuse, relationship-specific conclusions, cross-framework findings, corrective action, and continual improvement while preserving the distinct legal, normative, voluntary, version-specific, and certification boundaries of each source framework.
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